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Abstract  
The mobile agent paradigm has been proposed as a promising solution to facilitate distributed 
computing over open and heterogeneous networks. Mobility, autonomy, and intelligence are identified as 
key features of mobile agent systems and enabling characteristics for the next-generation smart 
electronic commerce on the Internet. However, security-related issues, especially integrity protection in 
mobile agent technology, still hinder the widespread use of software agents: from the agent’s 
perspective, mobile agent integrity should be protected against attacks from malicious hosts and other 
agents. In this paper, we present Code-on-Demand(CoD) mobile agents and a corresponding agent 
integrity protection scheme. Compared to the traditional assumption that mobile agents consist of 
invariant code parts, we propose the use of dynamically upgradeable agent code, in which new agent 
function modules can be added and redundant ones can be deleted at runtime. This approach will reduce 
the weight of agent programs, equip mobile agents with more flexibility, enhance code privacy and help 
the recoverability of agents after attack. In order to meet the security challenges for agent integrity 
protection, we propose agent code change authorization protocols and a double integrity verification 
scheme. Finally, we discuss the Java implementation of CoD mobile agents and integrity protection.  
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1. Introduction 
Electronic commerce is to use electronic means for conducting business transactions. Its 
implementation harnesses networked resources to foster the exchange of business transactions in a more 
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efficient and cost effective manner (Aaron, 1999). The market of e-commerce is growing very rapidly 
thanks to the increasingly greater accessibility of Internet services. The World Trade Organization 
expects worldwide E-commerce revenues to reach two hundred billion US dollars in the next two years. 
E-commerce brings benefits to both suppliers and customers.  
Besides current web-based systems, agent-mediated e-commerce is now playing a more and more 
important role. Mobile agents refer to self-contained and identifiable computer programs that can move 
within the network and act on behalf of the user or another entity (Pham and Karmouch, 1998). The 
mobile agent paradigm has been proposed as a competitive counterpart to the client/server paradigm. 
Instead of exchanging messages known as request/response between the client and server, mobile agents 
can migrate to a remote host and execute, thus taking advantages of exploiting the resource near the data 
source and reducing network traffics caused by frequent remote communications. Mobile agents may be 
equipped with intelligence ranging from simple decision algorithms to sophisticated reasoning and 
learning.  
Mobile agents have been proposed in many agent-based e-commerce systems and architectures 
(Greenberg et al., 1998) such as information gathering, comparison-shopping, agent-based auctions 
(Wang et al., 2000)(Wurman et al., 1998), and agent-based payment systems (Hua and Guan, 2000), etc. 
From the agent user’s perspective, mobile agents serve as “personal software assistants” acting on behalf 
of the owner in completing e-commerce related tasks.  The mobility, autonomy, and intelligence of 
mobile agents will be the key elements in providing solutions for  a flexible and smart e-commerce era 
of the next generation. 
In agent-mediated e-commerce systems, one of the biggest concerns arises from security related 
issues, especially the integrity protection of mobile agents when they are dispatched into open and 
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heterogeneous networks. Comparing the protection of network hosts with the protection of mobile 
agents (Marques et al., 1999), it is safe to say that protecting mobile agents is much more difficult than 
protecting hosts, considering the fact that agent programs have to rely on the host platforms to execute 
them. Most research carried out in this area typically makes the assumption that the code of agent 
programs is invariant after construction. This assumption has virtually made the integrity protection of 
agent code much easier because traditional methods based on digital signatures and hash functions can 
be used to verify the authenticity and integrity of mobile agent code.  
What are the benefits if agent code is dynamically changeable? In this paper, we propose mobile 
agents with a Code-on-Demand feature: a mobile agent can have its code upgraded with new function 
modules added or redundant ones deleted depending on the executing requirement. This type of agents 
will prove to be more flexible in e-commerce compared to the traditional static type. The challenges 
brought up by our CoD mobile agents are obvious: agent integrity should still be verified and ensured 
even if code changes.  
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews some previous research work in the 
direction of protecting mobile agents, assuming the static code model. Section 3 introduces CoD mobile 
agents and discusses advantages to their static counterpart. Section 4 discusses code change 
authorization protocols and proposes an integrity protection scheme based on double integrity 
verification. Laboratory prototype implementation is discussed in details in section 5. In the end, we 
conclude this paper and look into future research work. 
 
2. Related work in agent integrity protection 
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Mobile agents become especially vulnerable when traveling among network hosts. For a reliable 
e-commerce system, mobile agents must be protected from attacks from malicious hosts and agents. 
There are generally two directions in protecting mobile agents: detection and prevention (Vigna, 1998).  
Detection is aimed at detecting any malicious attack after it has happened. This can be helpful to 
immediately adopt remedial procedures after specific attacks have been identified. Prevention schemes 
are aimed at preventing the compromise of mobile agents in a specific way. Most of the work assumes 
that the code part of a mobile agent is invariant and what is changeable is only the agent executing state 
and the data blocks collected at each foreign host. 
 
2.1 Detection 
 
Schemes for detecting compromise of mobile agents treat code and data differently. Code 
integrity is treated in a simple way because they can be verified using the traditional cryptographic ways 
such as the digital signature over the agent code digest. The verification can be done using trusted hosts 
or collaborative agents.  
For the dynamically changeable data part, various approaches have been developed. Multiple 
Hops (MH) (Corradi et al., 1999a)(Corradi et al., 1999b) proposed by A. Corradi et al. is an integrity 
protection scheme for the SOMA project. It uses a shared secret stored in the original sender to detect 
any intermediate modifications when a mobile agent is visiting a series of hosts. This may provide some 
clues to deal with any change in the code part. However, one of the drawbacks of this approach is that 
the integrity verification can only be done after the mobile agent has returned to the original sender. This 
clearly is not suitable for the case of code part, because agent code should be verified intermediately to 
ensure its faithful execution. There are also some potential security loopholes in this approach, such as 
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the “visit-once” assumption made by the authors and the problem arising if a few hosts collaborate to 
cheat together. 
 
2.2 Prevention 
 
While most detection schemes focus on dynamically changeable agent data or state, prevention 
mechanisms try to make impossible any specific modification to the code part - which is static. Code 
cannot be prevented from modification since it is running on a foreign machine and thus is at the mercy 
of that host. What we can do is to prevent a “specific” modification that will be favorable to the host’s 
advantage. For example, in agent-based comparison-shopping, an agent is sent out to visit a series of 
venders’ hosts that sell traveling tickets. The later visited vender host may analyze the agent code and 
make modifications to its advantages: a malicious host may retrieve the information on the highest price 
the agent owner can accept and then offer a price better than the offers made by the previous hosts and 
below the highest price acceptable by the owner. 
One solution is to employ tamper-resistant hardware to execute agents in a physically sealed 
environment. However, these devices are relatively expensive. There are also some software-based 
approaches. A black box security mechanism (Hohl, 1998) proposes to create a black box out of an 
original agent. A black box is an agent that performs the same work as the original agent, yet with a 
different structure. Function hiding (Sander and Tschudin, 1998) is a software protection scheme applied 
to protecting mobile agents against malicious hosts. This approach hides important functions to hosts 
and makes real functions in the original code illegible. However, this has only been applied to specific 
cases for rational and polynomial functions.  
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The assumption that agent code is invariant is made in most research work on integrity 
protection. In this case, the integrity of static mobile code can be verified using the following 
procedures: (1) construct a mobile agent with static code. (2) use a one-way hash function to compute a 
digest over the agent code. (3) use the agent code provider’s private key to digitally sign this digest. The 
verification can be done reverse: first check whether the hash value has a valid digital signature using the 
agent provider’s public key, assuming that a public key directory service has already been established. If 
the digital signature can be verified successfully, a further step may be taken to compute the agent code 
using the same hash function and evaluate this value against the original digest provided. If it is not the 
same, a conclusion can be drawn that agent code is compromised. 
In this paper, we go one step further by removing the assumption that agent code is static.  We 
propose CoD mobile agents whose code parts are changeable at runtime. This will inevitably bring 
potential security challenges on agent protection, especially on code integrity.  Our goals in integrity 
protection are: 
(1) Allow agent code to change in an authorized fashion. 
(2) The validity of changeable code can be checked to ensure the integrity of agent code. 
(3) Host can also verify agent code to be assured of its validity. 
 
3. CoD mobile agents  
 
3.1 SAFER framework 
 
We are considering a mobile agent community proposed as in SAFER (Zhu et al., 2000)(Guan 
and Yang, 1999)(Yang and Guan, 2000): Secure Agent Fabrication, Evolution and Roaming. SAFER 
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provides an infrastructure for intelligent agent-mediated electronic commerce. The goal of SAFER is to 
construct a secure, standard, and evolutionary agent system for electronic commerce based applications 
and transactions. Figure 1 briefly sketches such a SAFER agent community. 
{Insert Figure 1 here} 
Each SAFER community comprises various components and entities, such as the agent butler, 
agent factory, community administration center, etc. We won’t discuss the details since they can be 
found in the earlier papers in (Zhu et al., 2000)(Guan and Yang, 1999)(Yang and Guan, 2000). For the 
clarity of later sections, we briefly introduce several entities relevant to our work. The agent butler acts 
on behalf of the agent owner for operating various mobile agents. The agent factory is responsible for 
fabricating mobile agents and other related code modules. Codes provided by the agent factory should 
bear the original signature of the factory to provide a means to verify the authenticity of the agent code. 
TTP is a SAFER certified trusted party in which CoD can be performed. 
We have integrated our CoD mobile agents and security measures into the SAFER environment. 
We start by describing the ideas on CoD mobile agents and then the corresponding integrity protection 
scheme. 
 
3.2 What are CoD mobile agents 
In the following sections, we introduce the basic concepts of CoD mobile agents. Let’s do so by 
citing the example of comparison-shopping in Sec. 2.2.  Assume mobile agent is sent out to visit a few 
vendor hosts to collect information on a few products and make decisions on each based on some 
complex decision algorithms. These decision algorithms are different and specific to each product.  After 
the agent has visited all the hosts for a certain product and collected information enough to make a final 
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decision, the corresponding algorithm in the code module is used. Should this agent carry all the 
decision function modules when sent out by the agent owner, as is normally done in the static agent code 
case before? 
Obviously, this is not efficient, since the agent only needs specific modules when making a 
decision on a certain product. Carrying all function modules at startup obviously has the following 
disadvantages: 
(1) It increases the “body weight” of mobile agents. This will add additional time/cost for agent 
transportation and add burdens to the limited network bandwidth. The advantages of reducing 
client/server communication is traded with agent transportation time/cost and agent weight.  
(2) It exposes more sensitive function modules to threats, since a mobile agent has to carry all the 
function modules regardless whether or not it needs them immediately.  
We propose CoD mobile agents as a potential solution to the problems. A CoD mobile agent is 
an agent whose code is programmed such that function modules can be dynamically added or deleted 
depending on the agent executing status. The agent can be upgraded to include some new code part to 
function. We further elaborate these two kinds of changes that can be made on agent code.  
 Addition: Agent function modules can be dynamically added to the existing agent code to 
form an upgraded version. Each function module should include the function code and also the 
proper digital certificate regarding from which this code is fabricated, namely, the source agent 
factory as a proof of its validity. For example, a digital signature of the agent factory over the 
collision resistant hash value of the function module can be helpful to prove both the authenticity 
and the integrity of the code. Addition of any particular code modules should get authorization 
from the proper parties. 
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 Deletion: Agent function modules can be dynamically deleted from the agent body to form 
an upgraded version. Deletion of function modules should also get authorization from the proper 
parties. 
Figure 2 depicts the functioning of a CoD mobile agent. This figure includes the SAFER 
components of the agent factory, agent butler, TTP and a few network hosts the agent is to visit. The 
agent butler, acting on behalf of the user, may download mobile agents from the agent factory, and 
dispatch them to remote hosts. During the period when a mobile agent is traveling among hosts, its 
structure including code and data part may be subject to changes in response to tasks carried. This means 
new data blocks and Agent Function Modules (AFM) can be added and existing ones can be deleted. 
However, such changes must follow the code change authorization protocol (elaborated in Section 4.1) 
depicted in the left part of the figure with the interaction of SAFER components of the agent factory, 
agent butler and TTP.  
{Insert Figure 2 here} 
For example, after the original agent provided by the factory is sent out by the user, it travels to a 
series of hosts to complete some tasks. When it finds out it needs some additional modules, it will seek 
to download these modules from the code provider – the agent factory. In host 2, both a new function 
module and data blocks are appended to the agent body. Similarly, when the agent finds that it does not 
need certain redundant modules, it will discard these modules in order to keep itself light-weighted.  
 
3.3 Why Code-on-Demand 
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Compared to the static-code mobile agent which is generally assumed, our CoD mobile agent 
exhibits some noticeable advantages: 
 As mentioned above, CoD feature reduces the cost caused by carrying code modules not 
needed in the near future. 
 Code privacy is enhanced. Since code module will only be added when needed and deleted 
when they become useless, irrelevant hosts will be less likely to spy on the important algorithms 
from the decision modules. In this case, the threat that agent code will suffer from malicious 
tampering is reduced. 
 CoD will improve the flexibility of agent functionality. Dynamic code will enable a mobile 
agent to process information that is originally inaccessible.  The agent can even change a 
particular function module if needed. For example, a user may want his mobile agent 
participating in an auction to have different bidding strategies to use when bidding for different 
products.  
 In case that a malicious attack on agent code really happens and has been detected, CoD will 
be helpful to recover a compromised agent. Such a mobile agent may still function correctly after 
being examined and replaced of the altered code module. 
Although CoD brings more advantages and makes the agent more flexible, it also incurs 
additional security challenges, especially when looking into the issue of verifying agent code integrity 
after the code as a whole has been changed.  
  
4. Integrity protection for CoD mobile agents 
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The verification of agent integrity consists of verifying different parts of an agent. When a mobile 
agent migrates in an open network environment, this becomes particularly important. As for the agent 
code part, integrity protection has at least two meaningful purposes. From the agent’s perspective, the 
verification will detect whether or not the agent code has been modified. If any compromise exists, it 
should be detected. From the host’s perspective, the host would also need a proper mechanism be 
devised for it to verify the validity of an incoming agent.  
When the agent code as a whole is dynamically changeable, this verification task becomes 
complicated. If we still use the simplified methods by validating only the digital signature on the digest 
from the code provider, the verification will fail since agent code has already been changed to include 
new or remove existing code modules. The host may mistakenly reject a mobile agent and identify that 
the agent has been compromised. Currently, we solve this problem by employing a supervised 
authorization protocol to avoid any unauthorized additions/deletions taken on the agent code. We also 
use double verification to ensure that the integrity of agent code modules both as individuals and as a 
whole can be verified successfully. 
 
4.1 Authorization protocols 
 
4.1.1 Supervised authorization protocol 
A supervised authorization is needed when more secured addition/deletion of agent code is 
needed. The supervised authorization involves the agent butler, agent factory and TTP. The update of 
agent code happens on a TTP. 
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In the supervised authorization protocol, both code addition and deletion should seek 
authorizations from the agent butler (on behalf of the agent owner in SAFER). In supervised addition as 
illustrated in Figure 3, an authorization proof will be issued by the code provider, namely the agent 
factory, and then a permit is forwarded to the mobile agent by the agent butler.   
{Insert Figure 3 here} 
The mobile agent needs to send a code change {addition, deletion} request to the agent butler 
before moving to a TTP for code upgrade. 
Request: AGT →USR: 
Permit Request: {AGT_ID, Host_ID, Change_Type, AFM_ID, AFM_Version, Download_Type}  
 
The agent butler will verify if the request comes from a valid agent that he sent out and identify 
the change type. If it is a deletion request, the butler can send the authorization permit if it is approved. 
Otherwise it will forward the addition request to the agent factory: 
Request: USR →FAC: 
Proof Request: {USR_ID, AGT_ID, Change_Type,  AFM_ID, AFM_Version, Download_Type} 
 
The agent factory will verify if this request is valid. The factory will also check if this particular 
AFM (Agent Function Module) is available for downloading. “Download_Type” means that AFMs can 
be either downloaded from the agent factory, or from local cache on the TTP if available and the digital 
signature and integrity can be successfully verified. We will allow the addition of AFM directly from the 
database but even in this case the authorization permit must be received and verified before addition can 
take place. If the factory has a newer version of AFM available than the one in the TTP’s database, it 
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will either provide an older version or substitute with the latest version, depending on the agent butler’s 
discretion.  
The factory shall send an authorization proof to the agent butler informing whether the code 
change request is approved or not. The agent butler will forward the permit message to the mobile agent. 
After obtaining authorization, the agent can start adding a new function module either locally or from the 
remote agent factory, or deleting an existing module. 
In the supervised authorization protocol, the agent butler is involved and will keep a record on 
the changes of agent code. This is for the purpose of providing up-to-date agent code status to hosts 
enquiries in later stages.  
4.1.2 Unsupervised authorization protocol 
In the unsupervised authorization protocol, the agent butler is not directly involved in the 
authorization process but will be informed after the authorization between the agent and the factory has 
been done. The agent can be equipped with the intelligence to decide whether to communicate with the 
agent factory directly for adding a certain function module or to delete useless code modules. If the agent 
is roaming in a relatively trusted host community, this approach will improve efficiency but obviously 
with less security: the agent butler may lose track of its agent code status eventually.   
 
4.2 Double integrity verification 
 
Integrity verification actually has two purposes. To hosts, before any agent can execute on the 
host environment, it must be thoroughly examined by the host. As long as agent code has undergone 
valid changes, such as authorized addition and deletion, there is no reason that the host should not accept 
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a CoD mobile agent. On the other hand, to the mobile agent, any compromise on the code must be 
detected. 
Here we would like to differentiate the integrity verification of a single code module and that of 
the agent code as a whole. An agent can be deleted of any code module entirely without affecting the 
integrity of the other code modules. So both individual and overall code integrity should be verified.  
We use the combination of a one-way collision-resistant hash function and digital signature to 
form a double verification scheme. For each code module fabricated by the agent factory, a digest using 
the hash function is computed, denoted as IMD. This digest is digitally signed using the private key of 
the agent factory, denoted as SFAC(IMD). Another digest of the overall agent code, including the original 
agent body, together with all the currently added code modules contribute to the value of OMD
. 
Each 
time the agent roams to a TTP to have its code updated, OMD will also be updated. This digest is further 
signed digitally by the trusted host using its own private key denoted as STTP(OMD).  
The task of integrity verification involves double verification of the digital signature and hash 
values of both IMD and OMD. The verification of digital signatures indicates whether or not the hash 
value is valid from the computing party of the value. IMD verification indicates whether the individual 
code part has been compromised; while OMD indicates the integrity of agent code as a whole. 
 
4.3 Discussions 
 
We expect that CoD mobile agents roam among SAFER-compliant communities when executing 
e-commerce tasks, thus necessary entities mentioned above are available in each SAFER community. 
The entry or leave of mobile agents to each community is assisted by the “Immigration” interface of a 
SAFER community. In order for mobile agents to find the most suitable resource server (such as TTP, 
agent factory), we assume that a global directory service that stores information for all registered SAFER 
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entities has been established. A “global” service stands above all registered SAFER communities 
compared to “local” service which is available only within a certain SAFER community. With this 
assistance, our CoD agents are able to use global IDs to address and identify a target destination (such as 
a global agent factory ID) or target resource (such as a global AFM ID) most efficiently. For example, 
demanded AFMs may be downloaded from the closest agent factory available, but not necessarily from 
the original one. 
There are also alternatives that we may consider for designing dynamically coded mobile agents. 
For example, Agent-on-Demand which allows the whole mobile agent available for downloading from a 
remote host, may enhance the trustablity and coherence of the agent code as a whole, as sometimes the 
introduction of partial code modules may cause unexpected problems. 
 
5. Prototype implementation  
 
5.1 System overview 
 
Using Java as the language for development, we have built a prototype to investigate and 
demonstrate the possibility of CoD mobile agents. The system is developed in Java due to the fact that 
Java provides cross-platform portability. 
Java also provides dynamic extension (Venners, 1998) possibility through the usage of 
forName() and ClassLoader. In the prototype, we used ClassLoader to load both agent classes and AFM. 
The ability to load AFM dynamically is what we call Code-on-Demand. We have also implemented the 
supervised authorization protocol and double integrity verification to protect the integrity of the agent 
and its AFM. We have used MD-5, a hash algorithm that produces 128-bit hash values to digitally hash 
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agent codes in the prototype. The resulting hash values are then digitally signed using Digital Signature 
Algorithm (DSA).  
 
5.2 Dynamic extension 
 
The Java architecture allows for dynamic extension, which means that a Java program can 
dynamically load and use classes at runtime. In other words, a Java program does not necessarily need to 
know all the classes at compile time. Thus, dynamic extension has the flexibility to allow a program to 
download necessary function modules when needed. 
Java provides two ways for dynamic extension: forName( ), and ClassLoader. A straightforward 
method is to use forName( ) to implement dynamic extension. ClassLoader, on the other hand provides a 
more powerful and secure approach to load classes at runtime. ClassLoader written in our prototype is a 
subclass of java.lang.ClassLoader. 
ClassLoader provides the ability to load classes into different namespaces and thus shielding 
types from each other. In this way, agents or codes loaded into one name space will not be able to 
meddle with agents from other name spaces. Moreover, ClassLoader allows for live replacement such 
that a new class object with the same name can replace that particular class object. The old class object 
can easily be thrown away by dropping all references to it. This is not possible with forName( ). 
 
5.3 Implementation of CoD 
 
We have developed a car dealer application in which we use a mobile agent to represent a buyer 
seeking a new car. The agent moves from one vendor host to another looking for cars that meet the 
requirements. Our agent uses JDBC to access MySql database in the search for a suitable car. However, 
when the requirements such as price, capacity are similar, the agent will employ a unique algorithm to 
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decide on the best buy. In our example, when such a situation arises in which a unique complex decision 
algorithm is required, the agent will first check whether it has the code. If some functions are seldom 
used, the lightweight agent will not be carrying the extra function modules. In this case, the agent will 
employ our code change authorization protocol to dynamically load the required function module. The 
following code demonstrates how we use the Java ClassLoader to load function modules dynamically. 
CoDClassLoader cod = new CoDClassLoader(); 
 try { 
         // Load Function_A_Class 
        Class Function_A = cod.loadClass(Function_A_Class); 
        // Instantiate it as an object 
        Object Fn_obj = Function_A.newInstance(); 
        // Cast the Object ref to the COD Function interface type  
       CoD_Function codload = (CoD_Function) Fn_obj; 
        // Activate the downloaded code function 
       codload.codmain(); 
} catch (Exception e) { 
      System.out.println("CoD class not found!! Terminate CoD loading!!"); 
} 
 
As shown in the code, agent application first instantiates a CoDClassLoader. The resulting object 
will be a ClassLoader object because class CoDClassLoader extends class java.lang.ClassLoader. The 
agent then invokes loadClass() on this ClassLoader object, passing it the AFM’s name. In this case, the 
AFM’s name is Function_A_Class. loadClass() will attempt to load AFM into its name space. If it is 
successful, loadClass() will return a reference to the Class instance that represents the newly loaded type. 
The agent will then be able to invoke function in the Function_A_Class object. In Java 1.2, concrete 
default implementation of loadClass() is added to java.lang.ClassLoader and the preferred approach to 
write a ClassLoader in Java 1.2 (Venners, 1998) is to implement the findclass() method. Therefore, we 
have created our own findclass() method in our prototype to dynamically load required a AFM. An 
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exception will be generated when the CoDClassloader is not able to find the Function_A_Class. The 
agent will then identify the missing function module by extracting the error code from the exception. 
Likewise, AgentClassloader is also implemented in the same way. Figure 4 shows the 
relationships between the ClassLoader objects and their namespaces. Namespace is the part of memory 
area that is private to the ClassLoader. As we can see from Figure 4, the HostClass and the 
AgentClassLoader are both loaded by the Primordial ClassLoader. Primordial ClassLoader which is part 
of the JVM implementation is sometimes called the system ClassLoader or the default ClassLoader. Our 
AgentClassLoader after being loaded into memory is in turn used to load the CoDClassLoader and the 
buyer agent. We can see from the figure that the CoDClassLoader and the buyer agent both sit in the 
namespace of the AgentClassLoader. Subsequently, CoDClassLoader when invoke, will load 
Function_A_Class and any other CoD classes into its own namespace.     
{Insert Figure 4 here} 
 
After the exception is generated, the agent will terminate and the host will request for code 
addition authorization from the agent butler as described in the design. After an authorization permit is 
obtained, the agent and the permit will then be transported to a TTP.  TTP will then use the permit to 
request for the new function module from the agent factory. Agent factory on receiving the permit will 
verify the validity and issue the new function module accordingly. The new AFM will be sent to TTP 
where double integrity verification will be used to protect the integrity of both the agent code and its 
AFM. Subsequently, the updated agent is then sent back to the original vendor host. The agent equipped 
with an updated decision algorithm will be able to make decision on the car to purchase. 
Figure 5 shows the vendor host’s user interface in our prototype system. As seen from the screen 
shot, there are three text boxes, which shows agent action, security check status and communication 
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status respectively. The figure illustrates the situation when a requested AFM is not found. Figure 6 
shows the screen display of the agent butler receiving an authorization permit. 
{Insert Figure 5 here} 
{Insert Figure 6 here} 
 
5.4 Integrity protection 
 
We have applied double integrity verification technique to our prototype system as shown in 
figure 4. Firstly the agent factory digitally signs the AFM code. A hash algorithm MD-5 is used to 
produce a 128-bit hash value of the agent function module. The resulting hash value is then digitally 
signed using DSA with the agent factory’s 1024 bits private key. The resulting signature file and the 
agent function module are then sent to TTP.  
TTP upon receiving the agent function module will produce a hash value of the received code 
and verify it by using an instance of the Signature class. A Signature object is created using the same 
signature algorithm as was used to generate the signature. After verifying the integrity of AFM, TTP will 
then digitally sign the updated agent with its own private key. This is what we called double integrity 
veryfication by authenticating both individual and overall code integrity. Figure 7 shows the screen 
display when the TTP generates signature for both the agent and its AFM. Finally, the updated buyer 
agent is then sent back to the vendor host. Figure 8 shows an AFM being loaded successfully by the 
buyer agent. 
{Insert Figure 7 here} 
{Insert Figure 8 here} 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
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In this paper, we have proposed a novel type of CoD mobile agents. CoD agents are mobile 
agents whose code is dynamically upgradeable. This feature is attractive in improving the flexibility of 
mobile agents and may have much potential usage in the rapidly developing agent-mediated electronic 
commerce applications.  Besides, CoD can help to protect code privacy, reduce transport cost, and help 
in agent recovery after malicious attacks. Regarding the challenges brought up by code variation, we 
provide security schemes of code change authorization and double integrity verification. Through the 
implementation of a practical solution, it has shown that CoD is feasible and security protection can be 
achieved with Java’s advanced feature of dynamic extension.  
We have addressed CoD mobile agents and security issues in electronic commerce scenarios. 
Mobile agents as flexible, autonomous and intelligent entities have made them a viable solution to be 
employed in e-commerce applications. However, security problems such as integrity protection must be 
resolved before they come into full commercial use. We do not claim that we have provided a complete 
solution to this new type of dynamic code mobile agents; rather, we treat this as an attractive feature in 
SAFER framework and a first step toward deeper research in this direction.   
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Figure 1. SAFER Agent Community 
 
Figure 2. Functioning of a CoD Mobile Agent 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Supervised Authorization Protocol for Code Addition 
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Figure 4.  ClassLoader Objects and Name Spaces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Sample Screen Shot of Vendor Host When Needed AFM Not Found 
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Figure 6. Sample Screen Shot of Agent Butler Receiving a Permit 
 
Figure 7. Sample Screen Shot of TTP Signing Agent and Its AFM 
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Figure 8. Sample Screen Shot of an AFM Being Loaded Successfully 
